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Case No. 20150594-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of possession with 
-~ intent to distribute a controlled substance, second degree felonies, Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-S(l)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2015); two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance, class B misdemeanors, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(i) 
(West Supp. 2015); and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37a-5(1) (West 2012), a class B misdemeanor. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Police found distributable amounts of methamphetamine and 
Oxycodone, along with a digital scale and other drug paraphernalia, in a safe 
stowed in the h·unk of a car Defendant's wife was driving. The safe also 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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contained checks and identification documents belonging to people not 
involved in this case. Police later found marijuana in Defendant's bedroom 
along with checks similar to those found in the safe. During later questioning, 
Defendant admitted that the drugs in the safe were his and not his wife's. A 
passenger in the car told police that the safe and the drugs were Defendant's, 
and the evidence corroborated her statement. 
Defendant later repeatedly contacted the investigating detective offering 
to reveal the identities of drug dealers in exchange for leniency. He claimed to 
know several dealers who trafficked in large ainounts of drugs, including one 
from whom he could obtain pounds of heroin. There is no evidence that he 
ever discussed his requests for leniency with the prosecuting attorney. See Utah 
R. Evid. 410 (excluding statements "made during plea discussions with an 
attorney for the prosecuting authority"). 
Has Defendant shown that his counsel was ineffective because he did not: 
a. object under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, to testhnony that 
Defendant offered to identify drug dealers in exchange for 
leniency? 
b. object to the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument asserting that 
defendant was an admitted drug dealer who was dish·ibuting 
pounds of heroin? 
c. object that under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, the detective's 
testilnony that Defendant discussed with him the possibility of 
identifying drug dealers in exchange for leniency was inad1nissible 
evidence of plea negotiations? 
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Standard of Review. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims raised for the 
first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 
160, if 34, 354 P.3d 791. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains Utah R. Evid. 403, and 410. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Officers from the Utah County Major Crhnes Task Force were surveilling 
Defendant's home in Lindon, Utah, when they saw a car leave. R446,451-53. 
Police followed the car. R453. They did not see Defendant enter the car and 
were not sure who was in the car, but hoped that it was Defendant. R453-
54,524. Officers briefly lost sight of the car when it pulled behind a convenience 
store. R453-55. The car shortly reappeared, however, and police stopped it 
after observing several traffic violations. R455-56. They found two women in 
the car, Arja Aaltonnen and Heather Marsh. R456. Aaltonnen, the driver, 
identified herself as Defendant's wife. R456-57. 
Police suspected that the women dropped Defendant off behind the 
convenience store, but no officer saw Defendant near the convenience store. 
R526. The convenience store was within a drug free zone. R487. 
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Marsh testified that Defendant was originally driving the car and that the 
women dropped him off at what she thought was the Lindon City Building. 
R558-64,571. She was not sure, however, exactly where they dropped 
Defendant off because she was lying down on the back seat at the time. R558-
64,571. The building housing the Lindon City offices is located about a block 
north of the convenience store. R453-54,487;SE20. 
Officers' suspicions were heightened when they questioned the women 
and received inconsistent statements. R457-58. A drug dog indicated that the 
vehicle contained drugs. R458. 
Police found methamphetamine and a pipe in Marsh's coat pocket and 
another package of methamphetamine in her bra. R457-58,534. They also 
found a safe in the trunk that the drug dog indicated contained drugs. R459-60. 
Defendant repeatedly called his wife's cellphone during the traffic stop. 
R460. One of the officers, Detective Palmer, instructed her to answer and then 
had her hand him the phone. R460-61. Detective Palmer spoke with Defendant 
and asked him to come to the scene. R461-64. Defendant refused, and offered 
to provide information about drug dealers in Utah County if Detective Palmer 
would release his wife and Marsh and not open the safe. R461,508. Detective 
Palmer would not agree to Defendant's proposal. R464. 
-4-
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Defendant eventually agreed to meet officers at a different location, but 
failed to appear there. R464-65. Officers instead discovered him trying to leave 
his house with a suitcase. R465. When he saw the police, Defendant threw the 
suitcase back inside the house and locked the door. R465. Officers arrested him 
and brought him to the scene of the traffic stop. R465. 
Meanwhile, Detective Palmer obtained a search warrant for the safe. 
R466. He asked Defendant to give him the combination so he could "open it 
nicely." R466. Defendant refused, claiming that doing so "would implicate 
him." R466,542. Marsh testified that the safe was Defendant's, and that he had 
put it in the trunk before they left his house. R564-65. She also testified that 
Defendant used the safe to store drug paraphernalia and illegal drugs in 
amounts for both personal use and distribution. R565-66. 
Detective Palmer forcibly opened the safe and found: 
• 17.5 grams of methamphetamine, or about 20 personal doses; 
• 28 Oxycodone pills in a prescription bottle whose label bore 
Defendant's name; 
e 2 whole Alprazolan1 pills and half of a crumbled Alprazolam pill; 
• additional methamphetamine packaged for individual sale; 
e a digital scale; 
• several syringes; 
• unlabeled prescription bottles; 
• spoons, including a spoon with burn 1narks on it; 
8 two glass pipes of the type generally used for s1noking 
methamphetamine; 
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• two credit cards, neither of which bore Defendant's name or the name 
of anyone involved in the case; and 
• payroll checks, a driver's license, correspondence, and bank deposit 
slips all belonging to an individual who was not involved in this case. 
R467,471-86,506-08,544-48; 
18,19,33. 
State's Exhibits 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17, 
During a search of Defendant's home, officers found 1n Defendant's 
bedroom: 
• marijuana; 
• a bong; 
• additional checks similar to those found in the safe; and 
e a temporary driver's license for someone not involved in the case. 
R488-94,578-80 ;SE' s 22,23 ,2 4,25 ,26 ,27,28 ,29 ,30 ,34. 
Officers also found $540 in cash on Defendant. R494. 
Detective Palmer arrested Defendant, who agreed to speak with him after 
waiving his Miranda rights. R496-97. Defendant admitted that the drugs in the 
safe belonged to him and insisted that his wife had nothing to do with them or 
anything else in the safe. R510-11. Defendant never denied knowledge of the 
safe or any of its contents. R512. 
Defendant also offered to provide information about other drug dealers 
in exchange for leniency. R511. Detective Palmer discussed with Defendant the 
possibility of working as a confidential informant, but Detective Palmer 
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explained that he would have to consult the prosecuting attorney before he 
could make any such arrangement. RSll-12. 
Over the next several weeks, Defendant called Detective Palmer 15-20 
times offering to work as a confidential informant in exchange for leniency on 
his drug charges. R512-13. Defendant claimed to know II several ... big players 
... that carry weight," meaning that they distribute large amounts of illegal 
drugs, specifically methamphetamine. R514. 
Defendant gave Detective Palmer some names. R514. The Detective also 
had Defendant make phone calls to alleged drug dealers. R514-15. The 
individuals that Defendant identified were selling drugs, but not in the 
quantities the Detective was investigating. R515. As a member of the Utah 
County Major Crimes Task Force, Detective Palmer was hoping II to climb the 
[ drug-distribution] ladder versus go down." R446,515. Accordingly, Detective 
Palmer told Defendant that his offer to work as an informant was "just not 
going to work." R515. 
Defendant also contacted a local DEA agent and asked whether the agent 
could help him with the charges in this case. R591-92. Defendant specifically 
asked for help with his charges involving Detective Palmer and the prosecutor 
assigned to this case. R592. Defendant claimed that he could provide the name 
of an individual who could supply Defendant with pounds of heroin from 
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Mexico. R593. He told the agent that Utah County officers were being 
unreasonable and refusing to work with him. R598-96. 
The agent told Defendant that he would have to talk to the state 
prosecutor and local law enforcement officers before making any arrangements, 
and that he had no authority to make any II deals." R596. After speaking with 
local authorities, the agent told Defendant that II it wasn't worth it ... to pursue" 
the individual that Defendant had identified. R597. Defendant responded with 
anger and antagonism. R596-98. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug free zone, first degree 
felonies; two counts of possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone, 
class A misdemeanors; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in a 
drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor. R32-33. A jury convicted Defendant as 
charged, but did not find that any of the offenses occurred within a drug free 
zone. R324-28. The trial court therefore recorded Defendant's convictions for 
possession with intent to distribute as second degree felonies, and his 
re1naining convictions as class B misdemeanors. R354. The trial court 
sentenced defendant to imprisonment for one to fifteen years on the two second 
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degree felonies and to jail for 180 days on the three class B misdemeanors, all to 
run concurrently. R354-55. Defendant timely appeals. R357. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because he did not 
object under rule 403 to testimony that he volunteered to identify drug dealers 
in exchange for leniency. Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption 
that his counsel reasonably chose not to object to this testimony because he 
concluded that rule 403 would not exclude it. That rule creates a high bar to 
excluding relevant evidence. It applies only when the evidence's probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice. 
Counsel could have reasonably concluded that the testimony had high 
probative value because it helped to explain who possessed the drugs in the 
safe. Although Defendant initially admitted to the detective that the drugs 
were his, his counsel argued at trial that the drugs were not Defendant's 
because he was not in the car when the safe was discovered in its trunk. 
Defendant's statements that he knew several high-level drug dealers, and that 
he could obtain large amounts of drugs from them, where therefore highly 
relevant to establishing that the wide variety and distributable amounts of 
drugs in the safe were his. 
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Counsel also could have reasonably concluded that the trial court would 
view defendant's repeated offers to identify drug dealers in exchange for 
leniency as highly probative because they were arguably tacit admissions of 
guilt. Defendant's requests for leniency arguably showed that he believed that 
the charges against him were valid. The evidence also had a low potential for 
unfair prejudice because Defendant's offers to identify drug dealers were 
always tied to his requests for leniency, therefore reducing the chance that the 
jury would consider the testimony only as evidence that Defendant knew drug 
dealers. Given all this, counsel could have reasonably decided that a rule 403 
objection would be futile. 
Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection would 
have in fact been futile and the remaining evidence against him was 
overwhelming. Defendant admitted that the drugs in the safe were his and the 
remaining evidence strongly tied him to those drugs. 
B. Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective because he did 
not object to the prosecutor's closing argument that Defendant was an admitted 
drug dealer who was distributing pounds of heroin. Defendant claims that this 
argument was unsupported by the evidence because Defendant never admitted 
that the drugs in the safe were his, and claimed only to have access to someone 
who could supply him with pounds of heroin. 
-10-
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Defendant again fails to rebut the strong presumption that his counsel 
reasonably chose not to object to this testimony. Defendant did in fact admit 
that the distributable amounts of drugs in the safe were his. The evidence 
therefore supported the prosecutor's argument that Defendant was an admitted 
drug dealer. 
The prosecutor's argument that Defendant admitted that he was 
distributing pounds of heroin was arguably a reasonable inference from 
Defendant's statements. But even if it were not, counsel could have reasonably 
decided that objecting to the misstatement would have been more harmful than 
helpful. Had counsel objected, the prosecutor likely would have clarified that 
although Defendant said only that he had access to someone who could supply 
pounds of heroin, his admission suggested that he was in fact obtaining heroin 
in those amounts. The prosecutor also could have emphasized again that 
Defendant offered to identify this heroin supplier in exchange for leniency-
arguably a tacit admission of guilt. Additionally, this single, isolated 
misstatement was not inflan1matory. Counsel could therefore reasonably 
decide to refrain from objecting because doing so likely would have 
emphasized negative aspects of the case. 
Moreover, Defendant cannot show prejudice because the evidence 
against him was overwhelming. 
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C. Defendant finally argues that his counsel was ineffective because he 
did not object to the detective's testimony that Defendant offered to cooperate 
with police in exchange for leniency. Defendant argues that this testimony was 
inadmissible evidence of plea negotiations under rule 410, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. But Defendant asks for a rule 23B remand to develop further 
evidence on this issue and therefore concedes that the record is inadequate to 
decide it. 
Although he nevertheless argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to this testimony, this argument is improper because it relies on 
Defendant's extra-record affidavit attached to his rule 23B remand motion. The 
argument also fails because it is based on non-controlling authority. Counsel 
performs deficiently only when he ignores controlling law. In any event, the 
record refutes the argument. Rule 410 excludes only statements made to the 
prosecutor. All of Defendant's statements at issue here were made to the 
detective. 
-12-
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE DID NOT OBJECT TO: (1) TESTIMONY 
THAT DEFENDANT VOLUNTEERED TO IDENTIFY DRUG DEALERS IN 
EXCHANGE FOR LENIENCY; (2) THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING 
ARGUMENT; OR (3) TESTIMONY THAT ALLEGEDLY RECOUNTED 
STATEMENTS MADE DURING PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in three ways. First, he 
asserts that his counsel should have objected under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, to testimony that Defendant offered to reveal the identities of drug 
dealers in exchange for leniency. Br.Aplt.8. Second, Defendant argues that his 
counsel should have objected to portions of the prosecutor's closing argument 
that allegedly misstated the evidence. Br.Aplt.14. Finally, Defendant argues 
that his counsel should have objected under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, to 
testimony that allegedly involved plea negotiations. Br.Aplt.22. Defendant 
recognizes, however, that the record is inadequate to review this third issue and 
therefore seeks a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to 
develop evidence to support it. Br.Aplt.22; Motion for Remand. 
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective in any respect. 
A. Defendant cannot rebut the strong presumption that his counsel 
reasonably decided not to object under rule 403; nor has he 
shown prejudice. 
Defendant first argues that his counsel should have objected under rule 
403 to testimony from the detective and a DEA agent that Defendant 
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volunteered to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency on these charges. 
Br.Aplt.8. He asserts that this testimony had low probative value because it did 
not help the jury to determine (1) whether the drugs in the safe belonged to 
him, or (2) whether he intended to distribute the drugs, where there was no 
evidence that the drug dealers he knew were cmmected with the charged 
crimes. Br.Aplt.9. Defendant contends that the evidence improperly 
"encouraged the jury to find [him] guilty because he knew drug dealers." 
Br.Aplt.11. 
To prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant "must show' (1) that 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable 
probability exists that but for the deficient conduct [Defendant] would have 
obtained a more favorable outcome at trial."' State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 42, 
328 P.3d 841 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694 (1984). Defendant cannot do so. 
1. Defendant cannot re but the strong presumption that his 
counsel reasonably decided to forgo a rule 403 objection 
because the testimony had strong probative value and posed 
little danger of unfair prejudice. 
This Court's review of counsel's performance begins with "a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The presumption exists because of the "variety of 
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circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The presumption also 
recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the 
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with 
the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 
Defendant can rebut this strong presumption only "by persuading the 
court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." Clark, 2004 
UT 25, ,J6 (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted). The State is 
not required to articulate a reasonable explanation for counsel's acts or 
omissions. Nor does a defendant succeed merely because this Court cannot 
conceive of a tactical explanation for counsel's performance. Rather, '"the 
defendant"' always bears the burden to "' overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy."' Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ,19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689) (emphasis added); see also State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ,I46, 154 
P.3d 788. But when it is possible to conceive of a reasonable tactical basis for 
trial counsel's actions, then a defendant clearly has not rebutted the strong 
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presumption that his counsel performed reasonably. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, iJ7; 
State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, iJ58, 61 P.3d 291. 
Reasonably concluding that an objection will be futile is a conceivable 
tactical basis for not raising that objection. Futile objections do not affect the 
evidence before the jury. They do, however, have the potential to annoy or 
even alienate the jury. Such objections can also annoy and alienate the trial 
court and the prosecutor, with whom counsel may have interact with in the 
future. Thus, failure "to raise futile objections or motions does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, 150, 354 
P.3d 775. 
Defendant's counsel could have reasonably concluded that it would be 
futile to object under rule 403. That rule presumes that evidence is admissible 
and imposes a high hurdle for excluding evidence. Relevant evidence may be 
excluded under the rule only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by," among other things, "a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403 
(emphasis added). The rule "imposes ... the heavy burden not only to show 
that the risk of unfair prejudice is greater than the probative value, but that it 
'"substantially outweigh[s]' the probative value." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, 
,29, 345 P.3d 1195 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403) (alteration in original). "Given 
this bar, [courts] 'indulge a presumption in favor of admissibility."' Lucero, 
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2014 UT 15, 132 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993)). 
~ Indeed, rule 403 "'is an "inclusionary" rule."' State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 
222, 126, 112 P.3d 1252 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah App. 
1996)). 
~ 
~ 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only when it "has an 'undue tendency to 
suggest decision upon an improper basis."' Lucero, 2014 UT 15, 132 (quoting 
State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, 122, 275 P.3d 1050). Evidence "is not unfairly 
prejudicial simply because it is detrimental to a party's case."' Kooyman, 2005 
UT App 222, 126 (quoting United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 
2001)). 
Counsel could have reasonably concluded that the challenged testimony 
had high probative value for two reasons. First, it was directly relevant to the 
disputed issue of who owned the drugs. Second, counsel could reasonably 
conclude that the testimony arguably showed that Defendant had tacitly 
admitted his guilt. The detective testified that Defendant repeatedly offered to 
identify "big players ... that carry weight" - meaning "people who distribute ... 
large amounts of illegal drugs" - "in exchange for leniency on these charges." 
R514. A DEA agent also testified that Defendant contacted him offering to 
identify an individual who could supply pounds of heroin if the agent would 
contact the detective and prosecutor in this case. R592-93. 
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This evidence was highly probative of who owned the distributable 
amounts of various drugs in the safe. Although Defendant initially admitted to 
the detective that the drugs were his, RSl0-11, his counsel argued at trial that 
the drugs were not Defendant's because he was not in the car when the safe 
was discovered in its trunk, R656. Evidence that Defendant had direct access to 
several suppliers of dish·ibutable amounts of drugs made it highly likely the 
large amounts and wide variety of drugs in the safe belonged to him. In other 
words, Defendant's admissions that he had access to drug wholesalers made it 
highly likely that he was a drug retailer. 
For example, in United States v. Haynes, 372 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 
2004), the defendant's statement that he knew a woman who manufactured 
methamphetamine using a particular method was admissible under federal rule 
403, even though it showed that the defendant associated with drug dealers, 
because the admission was highly relevant to a disputed issue. Haynes was 
charged with attempting to manufacture methamphetamine after police found 
in his home various chemicals and equipment associated with manufacturing 
methamphetamine. Id. at 1166. Haynes claimed that he possessed the 
incriminating items only for making beer, and he introduced testimony that 
some of the incriminating items had non-crin1inal uses. Id. at 1166-67. One of 
the substances found in his home contained a substantial amount of phenyl-2-
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propanone (P2P), and one method for making methamphetamine requires P2P. 
~ Id. 
Haynes objected under federal rule 403 when the prosecution offered 
testimony that he told a DEA agent "that he knew a woman who manufactured 
methamphetamine using the P2P method." Id. at 1167. He argued that the 
evidence '"posed a danger that the jury would convict on the ground that [he] 
apparently associated with drug dealers."' Id. (alteration in original). The trial 
court overruled the objection and "admitted the statement, saying that although 
it was prejudicial, it was also 'highly probative' of Defendant's knowledge." Id. 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. It held that the statement was "relevant 
to show that Defendant was aware that P2P could be used to manufacture 
methamphetamine" and therefore "shed[] light on why Defendant possessed 
the various items seized from this home." Id. Its probative value therefore was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Fed. 
R. Evid. 403). 
Likewise, defense counsel here could have reasonably concluded that 
Defendant's admissions that he had access to high-level drug dealers were 
highly probative of whether the drugs belonged to him. 
Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that Defendant's 
statements were highly probative because they arguably amounted to tacit 
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admissions of guilt. Defendant arguably admitted that he had engaged in 
criminal behavior when, rather than disputing the allegations against him, he 
attempted to obtain leniency by offering to identify other drug dealers. 
Additionally, the testimony's context reduced, or arguably eliminated, 
any danger for unfair prejudice. The testimony was always tied to Defendant's 
requests for leniency. R514,592-93. Thus, the jury did not hear only that 
Defendant knew other drug dealers. The jury would have therefore understood 
the testimony to be important because it amounted to implicit admissions of 
guilt, not merely evidence that Defendant knew other drug dealers. 
Defendant cites several federal cases all holding that evidence that shows 
only guilt by association is inadmissible under rule 403. Br.Aplt.10-11 (citing 
e.g. United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1999)). But none of those cases 
involved a defendant's admissions that he had access to distributors of large 
amounts of drugs, or his requests to reveal his sources in exchange for leniency. 
As explained, the evidence here showed more than just that Defendant "knew a 
criminal." See Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 742. Defendant's cases therefore do not 
establish that counsel unreasonably chose not to object under rule 403. 
In short, the challenged testimony was highly probative of Defendant's 
guilt and possessed little, if any, danger of unfair prejudice. Defendant 
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therefore has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel performed 
effectively by not objecting under rule 403. 
2. Defendant cannot show prejudice because rule 403 would not 
have excluded the evidence and, even if it would have, the 
remaining evidence against him was overwhelming. 
To establish prejudice, Defendant must show "' a reasonable probability 
that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt."' State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, iJ86, 152 P.3d 321 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). A reasonable probability is one "sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (quotations 
and citation on1itted). Defendant n1ust do n1ore than show "that the errors had 
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. "Counsel's 
errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." Id. 
Defendant cannot show prejudice because a rule 403 objection would 
have in fact been futile. For the reasons explained above, the rule would not 
have excluded the testi1nony because its probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Because the failure "to raise futile 
objections or motions does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel," 
Defendant cannot show prejudice. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, ,ISO. 
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But even if such a motion would have succeeded, Defendant still cannot 
demonstrate prejudice because the remaining evidence against him was 
overwhelming. There was no real dispute that the drugs belonged to 
Defendant. Most importantly, Defendant admitted to the investigating 
detective that the drugs in the safe belonged to him. RSl0-11. 
In addition, Heather Marsh, a passenger in the car, testified that the safe 
belonged to Defendant, that he had put it in the trunk, and that he used the safe 
to store drugs. R564-66. The evidence corroborated Marsh's testimony. 
Defendant asked the police not to open the safe and he refused to give the 
detective the combination because he acknowledged that doing so "would 
implicate him." R461,466. A prescription bottle in the safe that contained 
Oxycodone had a label that bore Defendant's name, and checks similar to those 
in the safe were found with the 1narijuana discovered in Defendant's bedroom. 
R476-77,488-94. Finally, Defendant did not introduce any evidence to dispute 
the detective's testimony that the safe contained distributable amounts of 
methamphetamine and Oxycodone. R473,476-78. This, coupled with 
Defendant's admission that the drugs belonged to him, established his guilt for 
possession with intent to distribute even without the evidence that he claimed 
to know other drug dealers. Defendant therefore cannot show that he was 
prejudiced by any deficient performance arising from the lack of a rule 403 
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objection. Consequently, he has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for 
not making a rule 403 objection. 
B. Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his 
counsel reasonably handled the prosecutor's closing argument, 
nor has he shown prejudice. 
Defendant next argues that his counsel should have objected to portions 
of the prosecutor's closing argun1ent that allegedly "111isstated the evidence and 
that were inflammatory." Br.Aplt.14. He argues that the prosecutor misstated 
the evidence when he argued- in the context of recounting Defendant's offers 
for leniency-that Defendant (1) admitted he was a drug dealer, and (2) said he 
was distributing pounds of heroin. Id. Defendant has not shown either 
deficient performance or prejudice. 
1. Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his 
counsel reasonably decided not to object because an 
objection would have been futile and served to emphasize 
negative aspects of the case. 
During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury 
of Defendant's offers to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency. R670-73. 
He argued that Defendant admitted he was a drug dealer, and that he was 
dish·ibuting pounds of heroin. R672. The prosecutor stated: 
Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to work off charges with the 
Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA, how many of us would have 
the wherewithal to call the DEA and say, Hey, I've got these drug 
charges, I need to work, I'm moving tons of weight, pounds of 
heroin. 
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R672 (Addendum Bis a copy of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing). 
Defendant asserts that this argument was improper, and therefore his 
counsel should have objected, because no evidence supported the assertion that 
he was an admitted drug dealer or that he was distributing pounds of heroin. 
Br.Aplt.16. Defendant is mistaken. 
A prosecutor's closing argument is proper when it is supported by the 
evidence, or reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Houston, 2015 UT 
40, ,I76, 353 P.3d 55. Counsel '" for both sides have considerable latitude in their 
closing arguments. They have the right to fully discuss from their perspectives 
the evidence and all inferences and deductions it supports."' Id. (quoting State 
v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). The prosecutor's arguments here 
were well supported by the evidence and the reasonable inferences from that 
evidence. 
Defendant first argues that "there was no evidence [of Defendant] stating 
that the drugs were his." Br.Aplt.16. On the contrary, the detective testified 
that when he asked Defendant about the safe full of drugs and paraphernalia 
found in the trunk of the car his wife was driving, Defendant admitted "that the 
drugs where his, they weren't hers at all." R510-ll. Thus, the evidence did 
show that Defendant admitted that the drugs in the safe were his. 
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Further, Defendant did not dispute that the drugs that he admitted were 
his were in distributable amounts. The evidence therefore provided the 
prosecutor with a solid foundation from which to argue that Defendant 
admitted that he was a drug dealer. 
Defendant's repeated offers to identify drug dealers that he knew also 
supported a reasonable inference that Defendant was an admitted drug dealer. 
As explained, Defendant told a DEA agent that "he was capable of getting 
pounds" of heroin from a "Mexican source." R593. A reasonable inference 
from Defendant's admission that he had access to pounds of heroin is that 
Defendant is a heroin dealer. 
Defendant's admissions, and the reasonable inferences from those 
admissions, supported the prosecutor's argument that Defendant was an 
admitted drug dealer. The argument was therefore proper and any objection to 
it would have been futile. See Houston, 2015 UT 40, if 76. Consequently, 
Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel reasonably 
chose not object. See Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 50. 
Nor has Defendant rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel 
reasonably chose not to object to the prosecutor's argument that Defendant was 
"moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin." R672. Again, this statement was 
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arguably a reasonable inference from Defendant's claim that he had access to 
someone who could supply him with pounds of heroin. 
But even if the prosecutor's argument was technically objectionable, the 
Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to object to every inaccuracy in a 
closing argument. See State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, if 71, 318 P.3d 1221 
(recognizing that some "instances of prosecutorial misconduct, standing alone, 
may not have required an objection from trial counsel"). When counsel does 
not "object to a prosecutor's statements during closing argument, the question 
is 'not whether the prosecutor's comments were proper, but whether they were so 
improper that counsel's only defensible choice was to interrupt those comments 
with an objection." Houston, 2015 UT 40, ~76 (quoting Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 
F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir.1994)) (emphasis in original). One reason counsel can 
reasonably decide not to object to "improper" closing argument is to avoid 
"emphasiz[ing] the negative aspects of the case to the jury." West Valley City v. 
Rislow, 736 P.2d 637, 638 (Utah App. 1987). Defendant's case presents a prime 
example of an opportunity to employ that strategy. 
Counsel could have reasonably concluded that objecting to the 
prosecutor's alleged misstatement would have given the prosecutor another 
opportunity to clarify his argument in a way that would have ended up in the 
same place-evidence that Defendant knew someone who could supply hiln 
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with pounds of heroin supported an inference that Defendant was getting 
pounds of heroin to sell himself. 
Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that objecting would have 
allowed the prosecutor to again emphasize what the jury could arguably 
conclude were Defendant's tacit admissions of guilt. Had counsel raised the 
objection that Defendant now identifies, the prosecutor may have taken the 
opportunity to clarify that although Defendant did not directly admit that he 
was distributing pounds of heroin, he did admit that he had a source that could 
provide him with that amount, and that Defendant made this admission in the 
context of seeking leniency on these charges. Defense counsel could have 
reasonably decided that this clarification would have been more harmful than 
helpful because it would have served to reinforce the idea that Defendant's 
repeated offers to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency were arguably 
tacit admissions of guilt. 
Defendant asserts that counsel was required to object because the 
argument was "improper and inflammatory." Br.Aplt.18. But counsel could 
have reasonably decided that the prosecutor's statement about pounds of 
heroin was not inflammatory because it was a single, isolated remark. See State 
v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if 34,322 P.3d 761 (holding that prosecutor's improper 
remark during closing argument "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
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because it was a singular, isolated statement and was not the focus of the 
prosecutor's argument"). 
In short, because conceivable strategic reasons support counsel's decision 
not to object to the prosecutor's closing argument, Defendant has failed to rebut 
the strong presumption that his counsel performed reasonably. See State v. 
Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
2. Defendant cannot show prejudice because the evidence 
against him was overwhelming. 
Even if his counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's closing 
argument, Defendant cannot show prejudice. As explained, an objection to the 
statement that Defendant was distributing pounds of heroin likely would have 
done more harm than good. 
Additionally, as explained, the evidence against Defendant was 
overwhelming. Defendant directly admitted that the drugs in the safe belonged 
to him, and he did not dispute that they were in distributable amounts. 
Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably inferred from his repeated 
requests for leniency that he had tacitly admitted his guilt. And other evidence 
strongly tied Defendant to the drugs in the safe and in his bedroom. Defendant 
therefore cannot show that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance that 
may have occurred. See Hales, 2007 UT 14, ,I86. Consequently, he cannot show 
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that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's closing 
argument. 
C. The record is inadequate to resolve Defendant's claim that his 
counsel was ineffective for not objecting under rule 410 to 
testimony that allegedly involved plea discussions; in any event, 
the controlling law available to counsel would not have 
supported an argument that Defendant's discussions with police 
were plea negotiations. 
Defendant finally argues that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence, to the detective's testimony that 
Defendant offered to identify drug dealers in exchange for leniency. Br.Aplt.22. 
Defendant argues that this testimony was inadmissible because it involved 
statements made during plea negotiations. Br.Aplt.22-26. Defendant seeks a 
remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the 
record with his testimony regarding his discussions with the detective. 
Br.Aplt.22. He notes that although the record contains the detective's testimony 
about alleged plea negotiations, "it does not contain any information about 
[Defendant's] views of those negotiations." Br.Aplt.23. 
Although he recognizes that the record is inadequate to review this claim, 
Defendant nevertheless relies on his extra-record affidavit attached to his rule 
23B motion to argue in his brief that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
to the detective's testimony under rule 410. Br.Aplt.22-26. This is improper. 
Defendant's extra-record affidavit is relevant only to determining whether a 
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rule 23B remand is appropriate. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah 
App. 1998) (affidavits supporting rule 23B motions are considered "solely to 
determine the propriety of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
for evidentiary hearings"). The affidavit is not part of the record on appeal and 
therefore cannot support a holding that counsel was ineffective. 
Defendant's assertion that a rule 23B remand hearing is required to 
develop evidence on this claim necessarily admits that the current record is 
inadequate to decide it. This Court therefore cannot find, based on this record, 
that Defendant's counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the Defendant's 
testimony under rule 410. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if16, 12 P.3d 92 
(holding that because an II appellate court will presume that any argument of 
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which 
[the] defendant is aware," if II the record appears inadequate in any fashion, 
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed 1n 
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively"). 
In fact, the record refutes Defendant's claim that his counsel should have 
objected to the detective's testimony under rule 410. That rule excludes only 
statements II made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting 
authority." Utah R. Evid. 410 (emphasis added). All of Defendant's statements 
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at issue here were made to the investigating detective, not to the prosecutor. 
R511-14. 
Defendant argues that rule 410 can be read to include statements made to 
a law enforcement officer who represents that he has authority to negotiate a 
plea bargain. Br.Aplt.24-25. He relies entirely on non-controlling authority to 
support this novel interpretation. Br.Aplt.24-25. This alone defeats his 
argument that his counsel performed deficiently. 
A showing of deficient performance must be based on "the law in effect 
at the time of trial." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). In other 
words, to perform deficiently, counsel must disregard "controlling appellate 
law" that existed at the time of trial. State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, if 9, 228 P.3d 
1255; see also In re N.A.D., 2014 UT App 249, iJ6, 338 P.3d 226 ("Because there 
was no basis in existing law for N.A.D.' s counsel to have requested that the 
juvenile court judge recuse herself, N.A.D. cannot show that his counsel 
performed deficiently."). Defendant does not identify, not could the State find, 
any controlling authority interpreting rule 410 as he does. Defendant therefore 
cannot show that his counsel performed deficiently. 
But even if Defendant could base his claim on non-controlling authority, 
the record contains no evidence that the detective represented that he had any 
authority to engage in plea negotiations. Rather, as Defendant acknowledges, 
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the "detective testified that before he could make a deal with [Defendant] he 
had to talk to the prosecuting attorney." Br.Aplt.22 (citing RSll-12). Defendant 
therefore cannot show from this record that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the detective's statements under rule 410, because that rule was 
inapplicable even under his novel reading. See Utah R. Evid. 410. 1 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on 20 April 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
1 Defendant's rule 23B affidavit proffers that the detective represented 
that he could reduce Defendant's charges if Defendant cooperated. Br.Aplt.23-
24. As explained in the State's opposition to the remand motion, this Court 
should deny the 1notion because it is based on non-controlling authority, and 
counsel is not required to raise novel arguments based on non-controlling 
authority. Additionally, Defendant never proffers that he told his counsel 
about the detective's alleged representations that he could reduce Defendant's 
charges. 
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Utah R. Evid. 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, 
Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, 
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. 
The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the 
Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and 
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to 
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a 
basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of 
substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as 
contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 
indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate 
method of dealing with" surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. 
Tex. 1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial 
and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect. 
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 
P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
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Utah R. Evid. 410. Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements 
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is 
not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the 
plea discussions: 
(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn; 
(2) a nolo contendere plea; 
(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or 
(4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the 
prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or 
they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea. 
(b) Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3) 
or (4): 
(1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same 
plea or plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements 
ought to be considered together; or 
(2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false sta te1nent, if the 
defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel 
present. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. 
The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the 
Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and 
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. There was no comparable rule in the 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). However, withdrawn pleas of guilty have been 
ruled inadmissible by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Jensen, 74 Utah 299, 279 P. 
506 (1929). 
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charges. Thank you for your time. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, counsel. 
State may be heard. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
All right, ladies and gentlemen, I want to respond 
to a few things that Mr. Stewart has brought up to help 
assuage your mind as you make this deliberation. I want to 
start with one of the instructions that he brought up. He 
talked to you about knowingly and intentionally and those are 
pretty self explanatory. Obviously if he didn't know these 
things were in the safe, if the safe wasn't his, if he - if 
we haven't shown that then he would not be guilty, I agree 
with that. But No. Instruction 16, that third line when it 
talks about defining intent when it says intent and then you 
skip down to the third line, it says intent must ordinarily 
be inferred from acts, conduct, statements and circumstances 
and that's frankly what kills Mr. Edgar in this case. If 
Detective Palmer had taken the phone call that the defendant 
made to Arja, his wife/girlfriend and had said, Hey, just 
trying to get ahold of my wife. She needed to get picked up 
from a meeting I just had. Where is she? What's going on 
instead of saying, Oh, crap. Do not open the safe, let them 
go and I will come and cooperate and talk to you and give up 
other drug dealers. Intent is inferred from statements, 
acts, conduct. Is that the conduct of someone who is 
----------··006~ 
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innocent, that did not knowingly and intentionally possess 
these things? Someone that then came to the scene after kind 
of monkeying around with police for 20, 30 minutes and not 
meeting up and delaying things? What is he doing during all 
this time? What's he trying to buy time for while he's not 
setting up and following through with the agreement they're 
trying to make with him? Is it possible that he's walking 
home realizing, Oh, crap, the police are onto me, I better 
get home get rid of whatever I have at my house before the 
police get a search warrant get back to my house. Isn't 
that more reasonable than some idea that, oh, he's just 
hanging out at home all night, watching TV, his 
girlfriend/wife takes the car out with his safe in it, he 
calls what, just to check in on them and then immediately 
launches into this negotiation with the police. Looking at 
it common sense, use your life experience. What is more 
reasonable here? 
He talks about the pills bottle and tries to make 
it a bit of a moving target. So either it's a prescription 
for Mr. Edgar of oxycodone from a doctor that is legitimate 
oxycodone or did Detective Palmer misidentify it and it's all 
counterfeit drugs and it was never chemically tested so we 
don't know what this is. What is reasonable here? Is it 
reasonable that his doctor prescribed him 113 counterfeit 
oxycodone? Probably not. Is it more reasonable - or is it 
.____----~--------+•0066~ 
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reasonable that the police planted this. He's saying, Look 
at the pictures, it's not in the pictures. Well, so where 
did it come from? Detective Palmer pull it out of his 
pocket, throw it in there? Throw counterfeit drugs in there? 
I mean, what's reasonable here? It's reasonable that Heather 
Marsh's testimony matches up that he kept oxys in there and 
shockingly, here are oxys. Based on the detective's training 
and experience - this isn't his first day on the job - he 
testified that in his experience as not only just an officer, 
a drug officer but as a drug recognition officer, this is a 
common practice, look online, look at the markings, he did 
that, they matched up. It's oxycontin. Don't let that 
distract you. 
The whole thing talking about the meth, 16 grams, 
17.5 grams, whatever and that's consistent, isn't it? 
Detective Palmer said originally it's 17.5 grams, said the 
baggy weighs maybe a gram and the Crime Lab tested it and lo 
and behold it's 16 grams and based on his training and 
experience they can be sold in gram levels or 1.75 grams. 
He's seen all sorts, so whether it's up to 10 personal 
quantities or 15 personal quantities, if you're getting four 
or five hits which was the testimony off of each one of those 
quantifies, this is a distributable amount and when you match 
that up with additional baggies to package it in, it's 
packaged with intent to distribute when they're all in the 
31 
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same place. Not to mention the digital scales here. He's 
not Betty Crocker, he's not making brownies. Why does he 
have digital scales there in the safe? 
Again, what interest would Mr. Edgar have in any of 
this if he had just told the police, Hey, do what you will, 
I'm at home, I have no idea what's in the car. Safe? What 
safe? Why did he care so much to tell the police do not open 
that safe? Well, because he knowingly and intentionally knew 
what was in the safe because it was his including his pill 
bottle, including his stash of drugs which was consistent 
with what Heather Marsh said. Is it possible that Heather 
Marsh came in here to tell us all a big tale? That she's 
really the big drug dealer behind all this? She was 
sentenced over a year ago on a drug case associated with 
this. She took responsibility. I mean, what did she say? 
She was asked by Mr. Stewart, Did the police come down to the 
jail and try to flip you, try to get you to testify and work 
some deal out so you could get your misdemeanor, get your 45 
days of jail, what a gift? No. There's no testimony saying 
that she did. There's no testimony saying she got anything 
for her testimony despite however he asked the question. So 
what you're left with is someone whose here, afraid, 
testifying about what happened a year and a half ago saying 
Hey, I'm not familiar with the area that much, I was living 
in Provo primarily, lived there in Lindon a day or two, 
32 
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wasn't feeling good. I was laying down in the car. We were 
at home that night. Mr. Edgar comes home, he's angry saying, 
Hey, we got this appointment, gotta go, we've got to get the 
check deposited whatever, whatever. Okay. He says I've got 
a meeting at the city office building, let's go. He gets in 
the car - well, first he, what does she say, he takes the 
safe off of the couch and puts it in the car and secures it 
in the trunk. That's some details that stand out in her mind 
from that happening. Does that sound like something she's 
just making up from a year and a half ago or does it sound 
like something that really happened, the defendant 
transported this; that he knowingly and intentionally 
possessed these items? He's driving the car like he usually 
drives the car even though it's his girlfriend/wife's car. 
Sounds consistent. 
Next thing she knows basically, she's laying down 
in the car, they make one stop, he gets out, girlfriend/wife 
goes to drive, Heather goes from the backseat to the 
passenger seat. That's how the police find them. Doesn't 
that sound more consistent? She, you know, a year and a half 
ago, again she's laying down, not feeling good, not familiar 
with the area as opposed to Detective Palmer and his four or 
five other officers conducting surveillance, trying to stay a 
safe distance behind these guys, trying to make sure they 
don't tip them off and they're observing where they're going 
33 
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for the most part and then when they get to this 7-Eleven 
area and say, Hey, we lost contact with them behind the 
building for about 30 seconds. That's the evidence before 
you. 
And then again, you look at the drug free zone, you 
know, I, I, maybe I'd agree more with Mr. Stewart if you 
know, this said 995 feet and it was within a few feet and 
maybe they cut here, maybe they cut here but under 500 feet 
takes up this entire property. Add another 500 feet and what 
have you got now? Fit anywhere in here. Beyond a reasonable 
doubt? Is it possible they, the police totally misjudged 
this by a couple of blocks, that they were never in this 
area? No. They were conducting surveillance, they lost them 
behind this area, it's within a drug free zone. Saying 
otherwise is not something you should consider as a 
reasonable doubt with respect to the drug free zone. 
Mr. Stewart mentions with Agent Holmer, talking 
about the heroin, the comment about someone calls up out of 
the blue says they're Michael Edgar, what are the chances? 
So what does someone have to gain, right? I mean is it 
possible that one of us today could go and call the DEA, 
pretend to Michael Edgar - probably have to be a male - and 
say, Hey, I'm Michael Edgar, got some drug charges, want to 
work. Oh, I've got connections with all sorts of people, 
hook me up. Well so, if this were to actually go into 
34 
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effect, Agent Holmer were to go and track down Mr. Edgar, sit 
down with him, can you imagine the conversation? Hey, got 
your call, let's do this. Mr. Edgar is going to be like 
what, I'm never talked to you. Someone must be using my 
name. What exactly is to be gained by any of that? But 
that's what they're positing is the explanation here. That's 
probably what happened. Oh, and the caller happened to know 
that I was the prosecutor and happened to know that Detective 
Palmer was the case officer on this case. Imagine the 
coincidence that that would happen. It's a doubt, certainly 
it's a doubt. Someone could have called and pretended they 
were Michael Edgar, gave a phone number that he when he 
called back, Hi, this is Michael Edgar, that happened too, is 
that reasonable doubt? And that's where you have to look at 
- and I'll just read to you the part of the Jury Instruction 
No. 19 again, the second paragraph where it says uthere are 
very few things in this world that we know with absolute 
certainty. In criminal cases" - this is a criminal case 
uthe law does not require proof that overcomes every possible 
doubt." So certainly he's brought up some doubts, these 
bricks in the wall or bricks in the path, whatever, they're 
doubts, sure. You can look at them, isolate them, yeah, 
that's a doubt, someone could have called, that's possible. 
Is it a reasonable doubt looking at the totality of all the 
evidence? No, it's not. Considering this is the same 
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conduct he used with Detective Palmer the day of the first 
phone call, from the first in-person meeting, from four days 
later at the jail when he's still offering up to work. 
Imagine his surprise, you know, seven months later to get a 
call from DEA agents saying Mr. Edgar wants to work with us 
now, he's not satisfied with what you did. Well, his 
comments were, yeah, we didn't work with him. So again, 
information that's unique to Mr. Edgar was transmitted to 
this DEA agent whose here just to tell you about this 
conversation. He didn't have a prior relationship with him 
or me, goes to his credibility. 
You know, Mr. Stewart didn't mention it much in his 
closing but during his cross examination of the Crime Lab, 
Amberlee Neibaur, he's asking her about prescription 
methamphetamine, isn't there such a thing as prescription 
methamphetamine? Sure, it's possible. Is that a doubt? 
Okay, that's a doubt. There's such a thing as prescription 
methamphetamine. Is that a reasonable doubt? No, it's not a 
reasonable doubt. Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to 
work off charges with the Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA, 
how many of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA and 
say, Hey, I've got these drug charges, I need to work, I'm 
moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin. Who else mentioned 
heroin? Mr. Stewart said no one else mentioned heroin. 
Heather Marsh mentioned heroin. What does the defendant keep 
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in his safe? Meth, heroin, pills, oxys or oxys, Clonazepam. 
Just because heroin and Clonazepam weren't in the safe, does 
that mean it's not his safe all of a sudden? No. Ultimately 
ladies and gentlemen, you're looking at the evidence that's 
before you that has to be reasonable and the reasonable 
explanation is that he's a drug dealer and you'll get two 
carts worth of evidence. I mean, is this all just a bad day 
for Mr. Edgar, someone is using his name, called the DEA? 
Someone has a safe of his that they've put all their stuff 
in? That's not reasonable. 
When you focus on the possession with intent to 
distribute in a drug free zone, that's a lot of verbiage, a 
lot of clauses, a lot of phrases when you all run it 
altogether. What you need to look at is it doesn't mean that 
he had to intend to distribute those items at that 7-Eleven. 
That's not what we're here to say. We're saying he possessed 
them by that 7-Eleven and why did he possess them? Well, we 
talked about this, this isn't his personal use, isn't his 
personal stash, he possesses them because he's a drug dealer. 
He's possessing with intent to distribute. Where is he 
possessing them? Well, it's within 1000 feet of Lindon 
Elementary School, that's what makes it a drug free zone. 
don't get hung up on, oh, we have to show that he had to 
possess them, distribute them right there within the drug 
free zone. He could have wanted to distribute them that 
So 
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night, the next day, as long as he possessed them within that 
area with the intent to distribute them at some point, that's 
enough. 
When you look at the evidence, reasons why the 
defendant possessed the safe because Mr. Stewart talked 
about, Oh, it was never fingerprinted. Oh, we should have had 
some more proof that way. You've also got Heather's 
testimony about he had access to it, how he had it from the 
couch, how he packed it, how he transported it into the car, 
the whole combination thing. Who had access to this? Why 
are the police monkeying around with him if they've got Arja 
and Heather who are giving up information left and right? 
Heather is saying, Oh, yeah, I've got it in my bra, but all 
of a sudden she's going to say, oh, but I'm not going to give 
you the combination for that safe but by the way there's a 
safe in the trunk. Or is more likely that she's telling the 
truth and saying, Hey, I had no combination to it, Arja had 
no combination to it. That's why the police were talking to 
Mr. Edgar. Why would he have the combination to it unless he 
owned it? And why would that be corroborated by the fact 
that he tells the police, I'll give you the combination but 
it might implicate me so I'm not going to do that. Well, you 
know, frankly saying that implicates you. So that didn't 
really work out. 
Again, his pill bottle was inside and just 
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painfully over and over again he asked police not to open it. 
Why would you care if you don't know what's inside? 
Then under reasons why he possessed with intent to 
distribute, again, half an ounce of meth, 28 pills of 
oxycontin, you know, if someone else is walking down the 
street and they have a pill bottle in their pocket, 20 
oxycontin, and that's all they have, private personal use, 
private prescription, I agree. But when you look at it in 
totality of everything we have here, why is he possessing 
these things? To distribute them. 
In the end ladies and gentlemen, he had a mobile 
pharmacy. You heard testimony about - a mobile pharmacy but 
he is not a pharmacist. He is a drug dealer. He told 
Detective Palmer that, he told Agent Holmer that and his 
actions and statements and the totality of the evidence back 
that up and I ask that you find him guilty on all counts. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 
Let's have the deputy then sworn please. If you'll 
stand and raise your right hand. 
{Whereupon the bailiff was sworn) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, now is the time 
for your deliberations. We will deliver to you all of the 
exhibits. Here's the original jury verdict form. 
Officer, please, if you'll take that and place that 
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